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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to show the trends of electoral behaviour in Colombia’s 
municipalities in relation to the decentralisation process.  More specifically, based on a 
statistical analysis, it hopes to explain the relationship among the following variables: level of 
electoral participation, effective number of parties, decentralisation level, degree of socio-
economic development and levels of violence.  The analysis of these aspects allows us to 
identify both the direct and indirect effects of political decentralisation on some dimensions of 
electoral democracy in the local sphere.  The principal thesis of the study is that the electoral 
variables cannot be explained only by decentralisation, but rather that this process, together 
with the factors mention, have a relative impact on the observed trends in the formal political 
system.  Among the results of the analysis, two aspects merit highlighting: first, the hypothesis 
that fiscal decentralisation acts as an incentive for the creation of new political movements 
that would compete for the distribution of public resources is not proven for the Colombian 
municipalities as a whole; second, armed conflict and violence have negative effects on the 
exercise of the right to vote.  Political control by armed means is being consolidated via the 
direct coercion of voters or is degenerating into confrontations between the different armed 
groups, which impedes political participation through institutional channels.  
 
 
Introduction: The meanings of democratisation in the Colombian political system. 
This document’s general aim is to examine the evolution of some variables related to electoral 
behaviour in the nineties, specifically participation levels, electoral support and the number of 
parties at the municipal level, taking as a starting point the year in which the first popular 
election of mayors took place.  The second objective is to identify the factors that influence 
the behaviour of these variables, to which end aspects related to the fiscal dimension of 
decentralisation, the socio-economic conditions of the municipalities and the levels of 
violence and intensity of the armed conflict in the local sphere were all considered. 
 
The analysis of these aspects of electoral behaviour allows us to identify what the direct or 
indirect effects of political decentralisation have been on some dimensions of electoral 
democracy in the local sphere.  It must be noted that decentralisation does not necessarily 
mean greater democratisation, as various authors have pointed out.1 In Colombia, however, 
the debate about the design and application of the decentralising reforms have had as a 
                                                 
* This investigation was made possible thanks to financial support from the Crisis States Research Centre at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).  We are grateful for the critiques, commentaries and 
suggestions of James Putzel and Jean-Paul Faguet of the LSE and of Rodolfo Masías and Luis Javier Orjuela of 
the Universidad de los Andes. 
1 See, for example, Richard Crook & James Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation in South Africa and West 
Africa. Participation, Accountability and Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
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permanent reference point the need to democratise the formal political system by making it 
more open and inclusive. 
 
In the political camp, the theoreticians of decentralisation and the decision-makers expected 
that there would be a widening of the party system with the decentralising reforms, to move 
beyond the monopoly that the Liberal and Conservative parties had held onto in the political 
representation and decision-making arenas.  The popular election of mayors was implemented 
in 1986 for that reason, seeking to expand electoral competition at the local level and generate 
propitious conditions for the emergence and consolidation of political forces outside of the 
bipartite structure.  In addition, the political decentralisation reforms sought a wider 
incorporation of the different social groups and sectors into the formal arenas of participation, 
to overcome problems of state legitimacy and respond to the demands for greater influence by 
citizens and local elites in the political decisions.  
 
The goal of democratising Colombia’s political system has been present in other reforms, 
specifically the 1991 Constitution, which introduced much broader changes into the formal 
political system.  If the political system is defined as something broader than the set of 
institutions and norms that regulate the relations between political parties and the state, the 
system of relations among the different social sectors and between them and the state must be 
included in this definition.  In this regard, the Constituent Assembly was an attempt to 
democratise Colombia’s political regime, to provide space for social sectors that had never 
been included in it. 
 
Although the Liberal and Conservative parties have maintained their dominion over the 
electoral political scene for over a century, the bipartite system had become the object of 
multiple criticisms in recent decades.  In the first place, some social and academic sectors 
“began to perceive the bipartite system as a semi-closed, barely representative system and a 
source of exclusions”. 2  Moreover, the exclusively bipartite politics was considered 
responsible for the political crisis affecting the country, due to multiple factors such as the 
traditional parties’ inability to channel social conflicts or represent broad sectors of the 
society as well as their increasing delegitimisation for recurring to patronage and corrupt 
practices.  
 
Although the existence of a bipartite system does not constitute an obstacle to democracy per 
se, the institutional accords in the Colombian case between the elites of the Liberal and 
Conservative parties – especially the National Front (1954-1974) – resulted in rules and 
political practices that allowed the traditional parties to maintain their nearly absolute 
monopoly over government posts.  Different authors have perceived the bipartite system as a 
restrictive feature of Colombian democracy.  In this regard, Eduardo Pizarro argued some 
years ago that one of the greatest problems of Colombia’s political system was its restricted 
nature, reflected in the exclusionary bi-party monopoly, the permanent state of exception and 
the excessive centralisation of decisions in the executive branch, leading to the decline of 
arenas of popular election. 3  According to this thesis, the dismantling of the National Front 
did not give way to a truly competitive system, but rather moved to a system characterised by 
the bureaucratic divvying up of representative posts between the two traditional parties.  
 
                                                 
2 Eduardo Pizarro,‘¿Hacia un sistema mult ipartidista? Las terceras fuerzas en Colombia hoy’, Análisis Político , 
31 (May-August 1997), p.82. 
3 Eduardo Pizarro, ‘Democracia Restringida y desinstitucionalización política’, in Pedro Medellín  (ed.), La 
Reforma del Estado en América Latina, Bogota: Fescol, 1989, p.308. 
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With the National Front, according to Francisco Leal, Colombia’s more diverse and complex 
democracy came up against a:  
blockade, with well diversified methods, of almost all emerging forms of political 
participation.  Anything that did not make it through the bipartite sieve was 
systematically, subtly or brazenly annulled.4  
This exclusion was what gave rise to guerrilla movements such as the April 19 Movement 
(M19), whose hopes of winning power legitimately were frustrated in 1970.5 
 
It is possible to find other hypotheses in this regard, although with different focuses.  One 
example is Ramírez’s thesis about the exclusionary nature of Colombian democracy growing 
out of the marginalising of broad sectors of society that find no representation within the 
political regime;6 or that of Leal and Dávila about the patronage-based political system, which 
presumably became a fundamental mechanism of both traditional parties for guaranteeing 
control of the political regime.7  Others, like Francisco Gutiérrez, state that while there are 
distinct meanings to political closedown, what relates it to the Colombian case is closedown 
understood as an exclusionary bipartite system. 8  In this regard, he sustains that although: 
the existence of stable two-party structures protected by strong institutional 
designs do not necessarily shut down the dynamics of democratic representation, 
as the United States case and, above all, that of England illustrate, the Colombian 
case could be more restrictive.9 
This would be explained by the agglomeration of parties around the centre, which reduces the 
possibility that different political alternatives could enter with any electoral strength.  This 
restrictive nature, in turn, would be explained by the systematic recurrence of the traditional 
parties to extra-institutional methods such as violence, patronage and corruption to ensure 
their institutional control, or by forms of politicking that ignore the interests of the grassroots 
sectors once the politicians gain power. 
  
In this context, the decentralising refo rms at the end of the eighties and beginning of the 
nineties tended to democratise the Colombian political system.  In the first place, they sought 
to open up the political system, promoting participatory democracy at the local level as a 
response to the social protest that had been gathering strength in the previous years and to the 
transformations the country was experiencing in the economic and social spheres.10  This led 
to the introduction of the direct election of mayors, which sought to promote the incorporation 
of forces outside the two parties to these arenas of political representation and electoral 
competition, as well as to strengthen the relationship between governors and governed.  
 
                                                 
4 Francisco Leal, ‘La Crisis Política Colombiana: Alternativas y Frustraciones’, Análisis Político, 1 (May-August 
1987), p.77. 
5 The government at that time manipulated the electoral results to prevent the populist political movement called 
the Alianza Nacional Popular (ANAPO) from coming to power.  Had that occurred, the bipartite political regime 
would have come to an end.  
6 William Ramírez, Estado, Violencia y Democracia, Bogota: Tercer Mundo Editores, 1990. 
7 Francisco Leal & Andrés Dávila, Clientelismo, el sistema político y su expresión regional, IEPRI, Bogota: 
Tercer Mundo, 1991. 
8 Francisco Gutiérrez, ‘¿Se ha abierto el sistema político colombiano? Una evaluación de los procesos de cambio 
(1970-1998)’, América Latina Hoy, 2 (2001), pp.198-215. 
9 Gutiérrez (2001), p.193. 
10 María del Pilar Gaitán, ‘La elección popular de alcaldes: un desafío para la democracia’, Revista Análisis 
Político , 3 (January-April 1988), p.98. 
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It was particularly hoped that this reform would have important effects on the configuration of 
the party system at the local level, in that political forces other than the two parties that had 
begun to gain strength in those scenarios would find opportunities to gain access to 
representative posts through direct election by the citizenry.  It must be borne in mind that 
until then the local people in charge were designated by the governors, who in turn were 
designated by the President, thus permitting the monopoly of governmental posts by the 
traditional parties from the national level all the way down to the local one.   
 
Moreover, the direct election of mayors was accompanied by the creation of entities and 
mechanisms to strengthen civic participation in local political affairs, such as local 
administrative boards, the possibility of signing contracts between the municipality and the 
civic organisations for implementing works and providing services such as the popular 
consultation. 11 
 
For its part, the 1991 constitutional reform was seen as a way to solve a good number of the 
problems that were affecting the country, but mainly as a way to conjure away the national 
problems in at least three senses.  In the first place, the limitations of the formal rules 
constituted the main problem, since the different social and political actors considered them 
illegitimate and exclusionary.  It was thus seen as necessary to establish a new political 
framework, which implied institutionalising arenas for expressing and settling social conflicts 
as well as expanding and strengthening the arenas of political representation and civic 
participation.  Secondly, the reform appeared to be a clear opportunity to modernise 
Colombian political life and do away with the principal vices of the old political class (mainly 
the patronage system).  Finally, the 1991 Constitution was seen as an essential tool for 
moving beyond the bipartite regime and opening up the political space to forces that had 
traditionally been relegated or utterly excluded.  
 
For all these reasons, it was believed that the first step in paving the way to peace and stability 
was to move beyond a political structure characterised by closure and the exclusion of broad 
social sectors and political forces.  To that end, new rules of the game were introduced, such 
as: a) open competition by different social and political actors, which materialised into the 
unlimited right to construct political parties, movements and groupings; b) the incorporation 
of new political representation mechanisms, such as the national circumscription for Sena te 
and special circumscriptions for both the Senate and House, special circumscriptions for 
political minorities and the popular election of governors; c) new consultation arenas and 
mechanisms aimed at promoting civic participation in both the electoral aspect and the 
political decision-making process; d) the expansion of forms of political participation through 
mechanisms such as the referendum, plebiscite, open town assemblies, recall of the mandate 
and popular consultation. 12  
 
One of the main concerns of the political reforms was to find a way to surmount the 
limitations of Colombian democracy, 13 which presupposed the central, although not exclusive 
importance of promoting the opening up of the political space to third parties and the 
inclusion of different sectors into political life.  That is the direction of this study. 
                                                 
11 Gaitán (1988), p.100. 
12 Ana María Bejarano, ‘La constitución de 1991: un proyecto de construcción institucional,’ in Gandour, Miguel 
and Mejía, Bernardo (eds.), Hacia el rediseño del Estado, Bogota: Tercer Mundo Editores, Departamento 
Nacional de Planeación, 1994, pp.197-224. 
13 The promotion of new arenas of participation has also been laced with the need to counteract violent forms of 
opposition to the state and consolidate closer relations between the state and civil society. 
 5
 
 
Political decentralisation in Colombia: in search of the opening and broadening of the 
political system. 
This study posits that decentralisation can largely – but not exclusively – explain the trends of 
electoral behaviour in Colombia’s municipalities.  The inclusion of factors directly related to 
the local context is an attempt to nuance positions that attribute the majority of the changes in 
the party system and in the participation within institutional channels to the decentralist 
reforms. 
  
The different studies that examine the benefits expected from decentralisation and its real 
achievements differ with respect to the democratising effects attributed to these reforms.  For 
example, James Manor concludes that decentralisation may have democratising aims but can 
also be limited to achieving greater levels of efficiency and effectiveness in public resource 
administration.  He further argues that even for it to have greater reach in improving 
governmental performance, it must be linked to an institutional context based on democratic 
principles.14  
 
For the author, the benefits of democratic decentralisation are principally greater control by 
the social bases over the formulation of state policies that directly affect them, accountability 
by those governing to those governed, which makes possible greater levels of legitimacy or 
political support for the governments, relatively high governance levels that allow regional 
and social conflicts to be managed through the incorporation of civic demands into the 
decision-making bodies.  
 
Along this same line, Rondinelli states that decentralisation can help in the articulation and 
implementation of development policies aimed at securing growth with equality, 
strengthening the capacity of regional authorities, and capacitating political leaders in 
identifying their own development problems and priorities.15 This idea is buttressed by the 
evaluations of multilateral agencies, such as the World Bank, that have promoted these 
processes. They claim that decentralisation fosters efficiency, by permitting a close 
correspondence between the supply of public services and individual prefe rences, and 
promoting responsibility and equality through a clear relationship between costs and benefits. 
This is the justification for the establishment of local governments that are sensitive to the 
wishes of the ir citizens, and not simply acting as instruments of central government.16 With 
these decentralist processes in the early seventies, the governments of developing countries 
were seeking more efficient and transparent public resource management as well as the 
opening up of political systems in transition.  
 
Other authors, however, question the virtues inherent to decentralisation.  Michiel de Vries, 
for example, underscores that there is a similarity among the arguments justifying this type of 
reform and the reasons the opposing current puts forward for centralisation.  According to this 
argument, the devolution of responsibilities and power to sub-national government levels does 
not necessarily result in greater democracy and efficiency.  Factors such as the local elites’ 
                                                 
14 James Manor, The political Economy of Democratic Decentralization , Washington: The World Bank, 1999. 
15 Dennis Rondinelli, ‘Government Decentralization in Comparative Perspective: Theory and Practice in 
Developing Countries,’ International Review of Administrative Science , 47:2 (1981), pp.133-145. 
16 World Bank, World Bank Experience with Rural development, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, Operations 
Evaluation Department, 1987. 
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interest in, or resistance to, adopting the decision to decentralise have a much more direct 
influence on the democratising effects of the decentralist reforms.17 
 
In this direction, Stephan Haggard sees decentralisation as the result of a negotiation of 
interests among politicians at different governmental levels (presidents, legislators and 
politicians at the central and municipal levels).  His thesis is that the politicians at each level 
seek to augment or maintain their power to influence (directly or indirectly) decision-making 
related to the distribution of functions and resources, orienting the reforms to strengthening 
their own hegemony or political career.18  In this regard, the structure of the political system 
in its inter-governmental relations and decision-making influences the levels of 
democratisation reached by the decentralisation.   
 
Other studies mention the context of developing countries as a factor that has an impact on the 
ideal form of the decentralisation, as well as the real form it takes.  According to the authors, 
the stability of the democratic regime in question affects the efficient administration of public 
resources and the accountability of the local governments (specifically the levels of political 
violence and fraudulent or irregular elections).  The studies conclude that the existence of 
arenas of participation is not a sufficient condition for the success of decentralisation if the 
institutions that back the local authorities are permeated by clientelist relations or co-opted by 
armed actors.19 
 
Decentralisation in Colombia and the rest of Latin America has been understood as a process 
through which powers, functions and resources are gradually transferred from the central level 
of the state, on behalf of greater autonomy and leadership of the regions and municipalities in 
policy decision-making and implementation, as well as more direct participation by the 
citizenry in managing local public affairs.20  According to this argument, it was expected that 
the reforms implemented in Colombia in the late seventies would produce changes in the 
formal political system, specifically a closer relationship between citizens and rulers.  
 
The decentralisation process that got underway in Colombia in the early eighties was framed 
within the general aim of recovering the state’s legitimacy through the modernisation of the 
political, administrative and fiscal structures.  The process set two specific objectives: 
improve the provision of local public goods and services through the transfer of resources and 
functions from the central government level to the municipalities; and deepen democracy in 
the municipal sphere through the creation of arenas and mechanisms that would permit 
citizens to participate in governmental decisions.21  The aims of the decentralist reforms 
                                                 
17 Michele De Vries, ‘The rise and fall of decentralization: A comparative analysis of arguments and practices in 
European countries,’ European Journal of Political Research, 38 (2000), pp.193-223. 
18 Eliza Willis, Christopher da C.B & Stephan Haggard, ‘The politics of decentralization in Latin America,’ 
Latin American Research Review, 34:1 (1999), pp. 7-55.  According to Stephan Haggard, the decentralisation 
model adopted or its  characteristics (the fields or levels to which the approved reforms refer) depend largely on 
the structure of political parties.  For example, if the political leaders of a given party are organised at the sub-
national levels, the politicians from the same party who occupy positions (executive or legislative) at the national 
level will tend to make decisions that benefit local interests and demands.  On the contrary, if the political 
leaders are organized at the national level, the decisions regarding reforms will be made to benefit the interests of 
national elites more. 
19 Junaid Ahmad, Rethinking Decentralization in Developing Countries, Washington DC: World Bank, 1998. 
20 Luis Javier Orjuela, ‘La descentralización en Colombia: paradigma para la eficiencia y legitimidad del 
Estado,’ in John Dugas y Angélica Ocampo, et al., Los caminos de la descentralización. Diversidad y retos de la 
transformación municipal, Bogota: Universidad de Los Andes – Departamento de Ciencia Política, 1992, p. 37. 
21 Alberto Maldonado, ‘Avances y resultados de la descentralización política en Colombia,’ Documento 
Territorial, 52, Bogota: Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2001.  According to Edgar Salas, the orientation 
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posited from the outset the need to democratise the political system to make it more inclusive, 
promoting the participation of third party forces in the spaces of political representation, as 
well as promoting electoral and civic participation. 
 
The first objective arose as a response to two concrete facts: the accelerated growth of central 
government finances resulting from the growing local demands for expanded public services; 
and the political unrest generated by the low coverage level of basic services such as water, 
education and health services.22  The second objective reflected the need to promote a local 
public administration more responsive to citizens’ demands and more open to participation.  
There was also a desire to increase the possibilities of third political forces to hold elected 
posts, and to generate propitious spaces for the consolidation of new political movements.23 
 
To that end, the political reforms extended the electoral competition to posts that were 
previously named at the central government level (direct election of mayors in 1988 and of 
governors in 1991) and strengthened civic participation at the local level (local administrative 
boards and municipal planning councils were created, among others). 
 
Decentralisation was also conceived as a strategy to surmount the social crisis and political 
instability of the time.  This was reflected in generalised violence, an intensification of the 
internal armed conflict and increasing social protests associated with the state’s inability to 
satisfy the citizenry’s demands for the provision of public goods and services.24  
 
Three stages in the design of decentralisation in Colombia summarise the development of the 
reforms geared to fulfil these objectives.  The first, which covered from the mid-seventies to 
the early eighties, involved fiscal measures to strengthen municipal finances.  The main 
reforms approved in that stage are contained in Law 14 of 1983, which modified the 
municipal tax scheme (especially land tax) to increase the municipalities’ collection levels 
and make the tax system more elastic.  Law 12 of 1986 regulated the transfer of value added 
tax (IVA) to the municipalities and established parameters for investing this tax income.  
 
The political and administrative reforms developed in the mid-eighties, which define the 
second stage, contained the main advances with respect to participation and some municipal 
responsibilities for service provision.  Among the most important reforms was Law 11 of 
1986, which regulated the direct election of mayors and established mechanisms for 
community participation in local decisions (among them Local Administrative Boards).  
Other reforms to the 1996 Constitution deepened political decentralisation through the 
development of civic participation mechanisms (the popular initiative, Municipal Planning 
                                                                                                                                                        
proposed by the Colombian model is: administration-participation = local democracy-efficiency, understanding 
that decentralisation expresses these two final aspects and that the reforms are designed to strengthen of 
administration and participation through specific mechanisms and arenas (‘Evaluación de la descentralización: 
componente de capacidad institucional,’ in Departamento Nacional de Planeación, Evaluación de la 
descentralización municipal en Colombia: balance de una década, Tomo II, Bogota: DNP, 2002). 
22 Richard Bird, ‘Colombia: the central role of the central government in fiscal decentralization,’ in Richard Bird 
& François Vaillancourt (eds), Fiscal Decentralization in Developing Countries, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998, p.172. 
23 DNP, Evaluación de la descentralización municipal en Colombia: balance de una década , Tomo I, Bogota: 
DNP, 2002. 
24 Over 90% of the civic work stoppages occurring between 1971 and 1981 demanded better public service 
coverage and quality (Pedro Santana, ‘El desarrollo desigual de las regiones y el movimiento cívico en 
Colo mbia,’ Revista Controversia, 107-108 (1983). 
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Councils, the open town forum, recall of the mandate, the referendum, popular consultation 
and the plebiscite).25  The new Constitution also established the direct election of governors. 
 
During the third stage, laws were implemented that regulated the dispositions of the 1991 
Constitution and other administrative and fiscal reforms.  These delegated greater 
responsibility to the municipalities for public service provision and social investment;26 
accompanied by an increase in resource transfers from the central level to the municipalities 
(an amount that currently represents over 50% of their income, rising from approximately 2% 
of the GDP in 1990 to almost 7% in 1997).27  The analysis of electoral behaviour, addressing 
the concern about the need to democratise Colombia’s formal political system, permits an 
approximation to some of the expected changes following the implanting of reforms that 
sought to expand the party system and include citizens more in political decision-making. 
 
 
Methodological Precisions  
This research concentrates on some variables of electoral behaviour in the municipal sphere: 
level of electoral participation in the election of mayors, electoral support obtained by the 
major and effective number of parties.  Some effects of the reforms applied to the formal 
political system (direct election of mayors as of 1988 and of governors based on the 1991 
Constitution) can be examined through these variables, as they are indicators of the opening 
up of the system and hence of electoral democracy. 
 
The scope of the reforms to open up Colombia’s formal political system can be summarised 
in three points: a) widening of the possibilities for political forces outside the bipartite system 
to participate in the electoral competition and in governmental decision-making; b) creation of 
formal local channels of participation that permit the social sectors and groups to express their 
demands and preferences, influence decision-making and elect their rulers; c) strengthening of 
the electoral backing of local governments to improve their levels of governance and 
encourage more legitimate public administration.  
 
With respect to the first point, the effective number of parties measures how far the system 
has or has not allowed different movements and parties access to the arenas of political 
representation.  But the issue is not one of an ‘ingenuous count’ of how many parties 
succeeded in obtaining representation, but rather the effective number of parties in the arenas 
of representation.  For that purpose, we used the index developed by Laakso and Taagepera, 
whose construction “requires an operative definition of the number of electoral parties that 
depends only on the proportion of votes they obtain”. 28  Through this measure, the relative 
                                                 
25 Tools were also created with the new Constitution so that public service users could learn about and oversee 
the management of the companies responsible for providing these services, and the contracts between the 
administrations and civic organisations. 
26 Law 60 of 1993 establishes that the municipalities must earmark at least 30% of their transfers for obligatory 
investment to education, 20% to health, 20% to drinking water and sanitation, 15% to housing and the remaining 
20% to investment in the sectors mentioned. Law 100 of the same year assigned new responsibilities to the 
municipalities and created participation committees for affairs related to health, while Law 115 of 1994 modified 
the functions with respect to education issues. 
27 Fabio Sánchez, Diagnóstico de la capacidad de los gobiernos locales en Colombia Bogotá , a consultancy 
report presented to the IDB, 2000. 
28 Arendt Lijphart, Sistemas electorales y sistemas de Partidos. Un estudio de veintisiete democracias 1945-
1990, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1994. 
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size of the parties can be measured, letting the proportion of votes they obtained determine 
their weight.29   
 
The level of electoral participation helps identify how involved the different sectors and social 
groups are in formal decision-making processes about local political life, such as the election 
of rulers.  Finally, the electoral backing of the elected mayor has to do with political contexts 
associated with the candidates’ popularity, although strong voter backing for a given 
candidate can also be associated with anti-democratic political practices such as patronage.  
This variable permits the identification of relations of proximity between governors and 
governed.  
 
Table 1 explains how the indicators were calculated for each of the mentioned variables. 
 
Table 1.  
Variables Indicator 
Diversity of political forces in arenas of 
local representation. 
Effective number of parties (Council 
members) 
Change of parties or political forces in the 
municipal government from one election to 
the next. 
Alternation in municipal governments 
(change of party sign) 
Electoral participation. Number of voters relative to the electoral potential (mayoral office) 
Electoral backing for the mayor elected. 
Representativity: Number of votes 
obtained by the mayor elected relative 
to the total votes (mayoral office) 
 
 
The sample is made up of 870 municipalities out of the approximately 1,082 comprising the 
national total (in other words, approximately 80%).30  The regional and population 
                                                 
29 According to Laakso and Taagepera:  “In a bipartite system with two equally strong parties, the effective 
number of parties is exactly 2.00.  If one party is considerably stronger than the other, with a respective 
percentage of votes or seats of, for example, 70% and 30%, the effective number of parties is 1.72, a figure that 
agrees with our own intuitive judgement that moves us from a pure bipartite system toward a single -party 
system.  Similarly, with three exactly equal parties, the formula for the effective number gives us a value of 3.00.  
If one of these parties is weaker than the other tow, the effective number of parties will have a value between 
2.00 and 3.00, depending on the relative force of the third party” (Lijphart, 1994, pp. 114-118).  The formula is: 
   1 
S  e 
i 
2 Effective Number of Parties   = 
in which e is the proportion of seats of party i.   
For a critique of this indicator, see Juan Molinar, ‘Counting the Number of parties: alternative index,’ American 
Political Science Review, 85:4 (1991), pp.1383-1391. 
30 Municipalities with lost values of no more than 2 different variables for the same year were included 
(municipalities with lost values in the alternation variable were not included, since its ‘unpredictable’ nature 
does not allow this value to be calculated). We estimated 38 data in 13 municipalities, no value for the first year 
of the series (1988), since it is not possible to establish behavioural parameters for the first datum of any period.  
The estimation of missing data was done via two methods: the SPSS linear regression method for the values on 
the right side (2000), including the values of the variable in question for the previous years in the equation as 
independent variables (the value of the adjusted r greater than 0.6 in the equation allows this procedure to be 
used without any problem).  A similar procedure was applied for the intermediary values (1992, 1994, 1997), 
using the cubic splines method, which calculates the data based on the variable’s regression curve, taking the 
values of the immediately previous year and the one following the one being estimated to reduce the error in the 
curve’s tendency to the maximum.  
 10
distribution of the sample is adjusted to that of the country, and data were included for all 
local elections held since 1998, a total of five (1988, 1992, 1994, 1997 and 2000).31 
     
The statistical analysis of this work is aimed at verifying if, for the Colombian case, the 
relationship between electoral variables on the one hand, and decentralisation, violence and 
socio-economic factors on the other, fulfils the theoretical assumptions.  For that purpose, 
some relations were identified that have been relevant in the theoretical explanation of the 
behaviour of certain electoral variables, specifically those related to levels of participation and 
number of parties.  
 
The first objective was to test whether the electoral participation levels and effective number 
of parties of the municipalities are jointly explained by the fiscal aspects of decentralisation, 
the socio-economic characteristics of the municipalities and the factors of violence.32  Fiscal 
decentralisation is measured through the fiscal effort of the municipalities (municipal tax 
income as a percentage of the municipalities’ total income) and through the degree of fiscal 
dependence of the municipalities on the recourses they receive through transfers (percentage 
of municipal income from current income of the nation over percentage of municipal income 
from transfers).  The first permits identification of the municipal administration’s capacity to 
generate its own resources and respond to local needs autonomously, while the second allows 
the importance of the transfers in the municipalities’ finances (i.e. the degree of their 
dependence on resources from the central level, to be examined).33  
 
We also wanted to test the influence of decentralisation on electoral behaviour, whether the 
transfer of resources to the local level can generate greater levels of electoral participation and 
increase the effective number of parties.  The supposition is that the resources become 
incentives for the politicians and movements seeking to consolidate support among voters as 
well as for the citizens who perceive the vote as a mechanism for directly influencing local 
political life.  Similarly, the effective number of parties tends to be smaller in small 
                                                 
31 Although there were elections in 1990, this year is not included because the National Civil Status Registry, 
which is responsible for electoral information, did not publish those data.  There is only information for 40 
municipalities and capital cities, which is not a significant sample. 
32 The municipalities’ socio-economic characteristics are measured by population size, the index of unmet needs, 
the GINI or property concentration index.  Violence is measured by the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants 
and the total armed actions committed by guerrillas. Due to the lack of specific available data relating to violence 
associated with paramilitaries (rather than guerrillas), we have been unable to include separate calculations for 
their involvement. However, where their actions have led to death, these are included in the homicide figures. 
We do not intend to imply by this that only guerrilla groups have an impact in the levels of violence, and have 
sought to include qualitative data in our analysis to show the electoral impact of paramilitary violence. 
33 Although the ideal would be to consider decentralisation in its political dimension to explain electoral 
behaviour, it is impossible to establish different degrees of decentralisation in this dimension, as the reforms in 
this field granted the same faculty of electing local executive and legislative entities and the same mechanisms of 
civic participation to all municipalities.  The fiscal dimension of decentralisation permits the establishment of 
degrees and hence differences among the municipalities, which is why fiscal variables were included in the 
model.  There are different ways to consider fiscal decentralisation, depending on the type of transfers that the 
national government makes to the sub-national governments.  According to the fiscal federalism theory, such 
transfers can be: a) freely assigned by the recipient government, or b) conditioned by the transferring 
government to a determined application or to the fiscal effort made by the government receiving the transfers.  
The fiscal indicators considered in this research refer to the latter type of transfers.  See in this regard, Richard & 
Peggy Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, New York: McGraw Hill, 1989; Wallace Oates, Fiscal 
Federalism, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991; Presidencia de la República-Departamento Nacional 
de Planeación, Colombia, Descentralización y Federalismo Fiscal. Informe Final de la Misión para la 
Descentralización, Bogota, 1992; República de Colombia, Comisión de Racionalización del Gasto y de las 
Finanazas Públicas, Informe Final, Bogota: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1997. 
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municipalities while the political spectrum is generally wider in the intermediate cities and 
large urban centres.   
 
We wanted to test whether the electoral participation levels show an inverse relation to the 
municipalities’ population size, as there is more direct and daily contact between citizens and 
rulers or political leaders in small municipalities.  
 
The selection of these variables to see changes in electoral behaviour and their relation to 
democratisation of Colombia’s political system has an underpinning that goes beyond the 
mentioned characteristics of the formal system in Colombia.  A recent study on democracy in 
Latin America, undertaken by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), uses 
similar variables to construct an index of electoral democracy, which encompasses measures 
related to citizens’ political rights that have to do with the constitution of the government, 
electoral participation, electoral competition and electoral representation.  
 
These components are measured through the following sub-components or indicators: right to 
vote, clean elections, free elections and elected public posts.  Although the type of measuring 
tends to be more qualitative than that with which this study works, the conceptual referent is 
very similar, as the variables selected here also reveal the state-civil society relations through 
formal participation channels.34 
 
Together with the electoral democracy index, the UNDP study constructed three new indices 
that correspond to other spheres of civil rights included in the definition of democracy 
elaborated in the investigation.  These new indices are: a new accountability by the 
government officials (it measures citizens’ rights regarding the exercise of government), an 
index on civil rights and one on social rights.  
 
According to the research focus, the political, civil and social spheres of citizenship permit the 
development of democracy as a whole to be measured as a political regime in its three basic 
dimensions:  
The political regime consists of the organisation of political power in a particular 
society, and therefore in a relationship between State and society ... [I]t concerns 
institutional relations aimed at the resolution of three basic ...problems. On the 
one hand, the government or system or form of government, that is to say, how 
and who governs ....On the other hand, the definition of the relations between 
individuals and the State and the appropriate spheres of each. Finally, the 
processing of conflicts and social demands.35 
 
This definition of a democratic regime is key to understanding the importance of the electoral 
democracy index, as it is possible through its indicators to observe the degree to which the 
State guarantees citizens’ rights associated with the election of government.  For the case of 
Latin America, the measurements done in the 22 countries under investigation led the authors 
to conclude that, despite maintaining a minimum of electoral guarantees, the other indices 
demonstrate a deficient development of democracy:  
                                                 
34 Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), ‘La democracia en América Latina. Hacía una 
democracia de ciudadanas y ciudadanos’, April 2004, p.24, at 
http://democracia.undp.org/Informe/Default.asp?Menu=15&Idioma=1. 
35 PNUD (2004), p.226. 
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The deficient workings of Latin American democracies, with regards the offering 
of public services and the improving of the quality of life and human security, is a 
consequence of the deficient capacity of the state for the  protection and 
promotion of the citizenry in its social, civic and political spheres.36 
 
 
Behaviour of the political variables during the period. 
The data show that there were no significant variations in the levels of political participation 
throughout the nineties.  The national averages during the period reached levels greater than 
50%, which shows that an important proportion of the citizens eligible to vote turned to the 
established political decision-making spaces.  Independent of the motivations, this has had a 
direct influence on municipal government affairs.  Taking the national average for each year, 
Figure 1 shows that participation ranges between 55% and 72%.  From the beginning of the 
nineties, average participation dropped, remaining relatively constant in the ensuing years.  
 
Between 1988 and 1990, over 70% of the municipalities present participation levels of greater 
than 60%, which reflects a performance of this variable in the first two mayoral elections that 
favoured the democratisation of the political system.  Nonetheless, this behaviour did not 
remain stable, as over half of the municipalities show electoral participation values below 
60% between 1972 and 1977.  It is important to mention that Colombia has presented 
electoral participation levels close to 50% since 1974 for all elections, without any significant 
alterations being observed. 
 
Finally, it is important to stress that the data show an inverse relationship between the 
population size of the municipalities and electoral participation levels.  It is observed for all 
years that average participation in the small municipalities (population categories 1, 2 and 3)37 
exceeds 50%, with values even greater than 70% in 1988.  In contrast, the larger 
municipalities (categories 5 and 6) record averages of less than 50%, showing that there are 
differences in voter behaviour between predominantly urban areas and the rural zones. 
 
Regarding electoral backing for the mayor, the information in Figure 1 shows that the 
candidates elected during the nineties received more than half of the total votes, indicating 
that the rulers in general enjoy the support of a significant group that has expressed its 
preferences through the vote.  This variable did not show significant changes during the 
decade, which indicates that the rulers are elected with a significant consensus among voters, 
at least at the local level. 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 PNUD (2004), p.238. According to observations on the thesis of democracy as social organisation, Jennifer 
Mc Coy proposes that “the state of democracy is defined by the level of development of the citizenry, that is to 
say, what proportion of the citizens enjoy the rights that are implicit in the three spheres of citizenship, what 
strength these rights have, and in what proportion of territory and population the state has the capacity to protect 
and promote these rights” (PNUD, 2004, p.235). 
37 We took as a reference the National Planning Department’s following classification of municipalities into 
population categories: municipalities with a population inferior or equal to 5,000 inhabitants are grouped in 
category 1; between 5,000 and 20,000 inhabitants in category 2; between 20,000 and 50,000 in category 3; 
between 50,000 and 100,000 in category 4; between 100,000 and 500,000 in category 5; and greater than 
500,000 in category 6.  This classification will be referred to again later on for the explicative model.  
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Figure 1: Percentages of electoral participation and of the mayor’s representativity, 1988-2000 
Source: Values calculated by authors based on electoral data from the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. 
 
 
Finally, it is important to mention that the lowest electoral support averages occurred in 1992 
and 2000, which could be associated with a greater dispersion of the votes among multiple 
candidates or parties, given that the highest average number of effective parties appeared 
precisely in those years, as is observed in Fgure 2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Average effective number of parties, 1988-2000 
Source: Values calculated by authors based on electoral data of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. 
 
 
Regarding the effective number of parties, it is observed that the averages of this variable 
were below two at the end of the eighties, with a marked rise in 1992, possibly due to the 
push given by the normative framework of the 1991 Constitution to the creation of new 
political forces.  In 1994 and 1997, the values of the effective number of parties dropped 
again to levels very close to those of 1988, while at the start of the next decade it reached an 
average greater than two parties.  These tendencies indicate that the Colombian party system 
has ceased being exclusively bipartite in the local sphere, as around 30% of the municipalities 
present systems with more than 2.5 parties on average throughout the nineties.  In contrast, 
close to 10% of the municipalities in 1988 presented this tendency while 60% registered 
systems with fewer than two parties.  
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Table 2: Distribution of Municipalities (%) by intervals of Effective Number of Parties  
Source: Authors’ own data calculated based on electoral statistics of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. 
 
Intervals  1988 1992 1994 1997 2000 
1 to 1.47 0.30 0.15 0.30 0.30 0.20 
1.47 to 1.96 0.29 0.18 0.28 0.27 0.22 
1.96 to 2.45 0.30 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.23 
>  2.45 0.11 0.44 0.17 0.18 0.35 
 
 
This tendency acquired very important levels in 1992 and 2000, which can be corroborated by 
examining the behaviour of this variable in its intervals (Table 2).38  For these years, the 
proportion of municipalities concentrated in the interval with more than 2.5 parties 
respectively corresponds to 44% and 35% of the total sample.  On the other hand, although 
the proportion of municipalities with systems approximating multi-party ones is lower than 
20% in 1994 and 1997, that is significant compared to the tendencies at the end of the eighties 
(11%).  While cases have appeared that approximate multi-party systems, single- or two-party 
systems still clearly persist in a significant part of the country’s municipalities. 
 
The effective number of parties variable permits the party system in the Municipal Councils 
to be characterized, showing the number of political forces in accord with their weight within 
these representational arenas.  Nonetheless, this variable does not allow the party or parties 
making up that system to be identified, and it is a fundamental factor in discussing the 
importance of the changes within Colombia’s political system.  To examine these changes in 
greater detail, it is thus essential to examine which political forces have a presence throughout 
the national territory and the proportion in which they have had access to the municipal 
governments. 
 
Two additional variables are included in the analysis of electoral behaviour.  One permits us 
to observe the presence of non-traditional political parties and movements in executive 
municipal posts throughout the period.  The other shows the historic predominance of the 
political forces, calculated based on the number of times a party or movement has won the 
municipal mayoral race.  
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Figure 3: Proportion of municipalities that voted non-traditional parties into the mayor’s office 
Source: Our own data calculated based on electoral statistics of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. 
 
Figure 3 shows a favourable behaviour regarding new parties and movements.  Non-
traditional political forces won mayoral offices in 20% of the municipalities in 1997 and 31% 
in 2000.  In contrast, during 1988, 1990 and 1994, almost all municipalities (90%) had 
                                                 
38 Four intervals are considered; from 1 to 1.47; from 1.47 to 1.96; from 1.96 to 2.45 and greater than 2.45. 
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mayors elected under the banner of one of the two traditional parties (Liberal and 
Conservative). 
 
Although a broader party spectrum was expected in the municipal arenas of political 
representation with the first election of mayors, third forces only gained access to the mayor’s 
office in only 14% of them.  Additionally, there was a backsliding in 1990, as only 11% of the 
municipalities elected mayors from non-traditional parties.  
 
With respect to the party predominance variable, it is observed that one of the two traditional 
parties (Liberal and Conservative) was predominant in 52.7% of the municipalities during the 
period examined.  For the statistical analysis of this variable, a party is considered 
predominant when it wins the majority of the elections in a municipality over a period of time 
(i.e. 5 or 6 elections for the total 6 electoral periods considered).  This means that the bulk of 
the country’s municipalities still have a tradition of voting for the Liberal or Conservative 
Party, which can be explained by the bipartite characteristics of the Colombian political 
system and the fact that there is no third party so far that disputes this tradition at the national 
level in an ongoing manner. 
 
 
Explicative models of electoral behaviour 
To explain electoral behaviour, regressions were made for panel- type data, appropriate when 
crosscutting information is available over time.  The regressions consider two dependent 
variables – electoral participation and effective number of parties – and the objective is to 
explain their behaviour based on the following independent variables taken together: 
population size, fiscal decentralisation (through indicators of fiscal effort and the dependence 
of municipal income relative to transfers), unmet basic needs (UBN) index, GINI coefficient 
of property concentration, homicide rate and military actions of the guerrillas (Revolutionary 
Armed Forces – FARC, National Liberation Army – ELN and Popular Liberation Army – 
EPL). These explicative variables are socio-economic factors of the municipalities as well as 
aspects related to decentralisation and violence in the local sphere.  
 
In the case of the effective number of parties, the electoral district’s size and the spatial factor 
were also considered in order to correct interpretive errors associated with spatial effects on 
the behaviour of the dependent variables, specifically spatial dependence (known as spatial 
auto-correlation) and spatial structure (spatial heterogeneity).39  Finally, the regional factor 
was incorporated into the model, through which the municipalities are grouped into four 
regions: Andean, Pacific, Caribbean and Eastern.  
 
For the selection of the independent variables, we took into account some studies on electoral 
behaviour or party system that give importance to contextual factors as explicative elements, 
for example, the normative framework, the degree of development and the socio-political 
violence.  In this direction, a UNDP study on democracy in Latin America considers that 
diverse factors associated with political culture become relevant in the analysis of electoral 
                                                 
39 The objective in specifying a spatial econometric model is to relate a variable in a spatial point with the values 
of the variable observed in other points of the same space.  In a context of temporal series, this is obtained 
through the use of a phase lag whose function is to set the variable back one or more periods of time.  In space, 
things are not so easy, because a variable can be displaced in different directions, which is why a spatially 
weighted matrix that permits points of space to be related with various distinct localities is used, without having 
to worry about choosing the spatial dependence a priori.   
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democracy insofar as they affect the conditions for the exercise of the right to vote, free 
competition and electoral practices.  
 
With respect to the party system, some studies explain its size and composition based on the 
electoral system or the normative characteristics of the political regime.  For example, 
according to Liphart, Taagepera, y Ordeshook and Shevetsova, the electoral system, 
specifically the magnitude of the electoral district, has an influence on the number of parties, 
although it is not clear if it is the only determinant factor.40  
 
Other authors have rather focused on the emergence of new political forces.  In this 
perspective, Simon Hug, in the book Altering Party Systems, makes an inventory of the 
different investigations that attempt to explain the emergence of new political forces, making 
it possible to create a list of the variables that could be considered relevant.  The author’s 
hypothesis is that the formation of a new political party is the result of the interaction among 
the existing parties and outside groups that decided to create a new party.  This interaction 
occurs in a structured context, influenced by institutional or legal constraints and by the 
existing parties and, states Hug, in contexts in which uncertainty plays an important role for 
the parties.41  
 
The author makes reference to other authors, such as Pinard, who associate the emergence of 
new parties with contexts in which a single party predominate,42 the relation between the 
emergence of new issues in the political arena and parties that assume these debates as their 
struggle.  In addition, reference is made in Hug to other works such as that of Hamel and 
Robertson, 43 who find a direct relationship between the size of the population and the number 
of new political affairs that in turn stimulate the formation of new parties.  In the theoretical 
aspect, this study also examines the relevance of income inequality levels to explain the 
emergence of new political forces.44 
 
In this regard, the indicators of violence included in the explicative model for the effective 
number of parties variable (the homicide rate and the military actions of the guerrillas), as 
well as the size of the electoral district and the regional factor permit us to approximate these 
theoretical postulates for the Colombian case. 
 
With respect to electoral participation, the majority of empirical studies refer to the effects of 
democratic participation on income distribution, as well as on public goods and services in the 
local sphere.  The most common postulates hold that greater participation through the vote 
results in lower levels of inequality and greater levels of social well-being for the marginal 
sectors.45  Following this explicative logic, one would also expect there to be a relation 
                                                 
40 Lijphart (1994); Rein Taagepera, ‘The number of parties as a function of heterogeneity and electoral system’, 
Comparative Political Studies, 32:5 (Agosto 1999), pp.531-548; Peter Ordeshook and Olga Shevetsova, ‘Ethnic 
heterogeneity, district magnitude, and the number of parties’, American Journal of Political Science, 38:1 
(February 1994), pp.100-123. 
41 Simon Hug, Altering Party Systems. Strategic Behavior and the Emergence of New Political Parties in 
Western democracies, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2001. 
42 Maurice Pinard, ‘Third Parties in Canada Revisited: A Rejoinder and Elaboration of the Theory of One Party 
Dominance’,  Canadian Journal of Political Science, 6 (1973), pp.439-460.  
43 Robert Harmel & John D. Robertson, ‘Formation and Success of New Parties’, International Political Science 
Review, 6:4 (1985), pp. 501-523. 
44 For a detailed review see Hug (2001), Introduction. 
45 Dennis Mueller & Thomas Stratmann, ‘The economic effects of democratic participation’, Center for 
Economic Studies and Info Institute for Economic Research, Working Paper 656:2 (2002).  See also Andrew 
Foster & Mark R. Rosenzweig, ‘Democratization, Decentralization and the Distribution of Local Public Goods 
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between electoral participation and inequality in the distribution of income and social well-
being.  In other words, that greater levels of inequality and low levels of well-being would 
stimulate participation by economically depressed social sectors that are more marginalised 
from access to economic, social and cultural rights.  
 
In this regard, the socio-economic indicators such as GINI and UBN would be associated with 
the electoral participation levels recorded at the municipal level for this study. 
 
Other studies mention population size, the characteristics of the locality’s political culture and 
violence46 as relevant factors to explain the electoral participation levels.  Thus the study by 
Richard Crook and James Manor poses a direct relationship between the social and political 
context, the formal structure of the decentralised institutions, their relations with higher levels 
of the political system and the resources or administrative capacity and strengthening of civil 
society, among others on the one hand, and participation in formal channels on the other.47  
Diverse authors have examined the analyses of the influence of population size on 
participation levels.48  A relationship between these two variables has also been identified in 
the previous section of this document.  
 
 
Effective Number of Parties 
It can be observed in Table 3 that the size of the electoral district,49 the homicide rate and the 
spatial factor were the significant variables, with a 99% level of significance.  The adjusted R2 
of 0.2 shows that the model is solid to explain this electoral variable. 
 
The information contained in Table 2 permits it to be stated that, in the first place, the 
effective number of parties in collegial bodies tends to be greater when the electoral district is 
larger.  This factor determines the number of seats for which the different parties can run, and 
in that sense also determines the number of parties that can have access to these public 
corporations.  In other words, the fewer the number of seats available, the fewer the number 
tends to be of parties that can effectively gain access to them.  
 
In the second place, there is an inversely proportional relationship between the effective 
number of parties and the homicide rate.  The effective number of parties drops when the 
violence levels increase, possibly because they imply reduced guarantees of a free race for 
popular election posts and free and fair elections themselves at that juncture.  In addition, it 
can be said that the influence of the spatial factor indicates the importance of voters’ political 
tendencies in neighbouring municipalities in explaining the effective number of parties. 
 
These relations between violence, spatial aspects and the size of the electoral district that is 
part of the normative electoral framework on the one hand, and the effective number of 
parties on the other, ratify the propositions contained in the different studies examined by 
Simon Hug. 50 
                                                                                                                                                        
in a Poor Rural Economy’, Philadelphia: Penn Institute for Economic Research, University of Pennsylvania, 
2001.   
46 Marco Romero, Elecciones, reforma política y garantías electorales, 2004 (mimeo).  
47 Crook & Manor (1998). 
48 Annie Gaardsted Frandsen, Size and electoral participation in local elections, Department of Political Science 
and Public Management: University of Southern Denmark. 2003. 
49 Number of seats for collegial bodies in each municipality established by law according to population size. 
50 Hug (2001). 
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The main hypothesis laid out in this text, which is that there is a strong relationship between 
the number of parties and fiscal decentralisation factors, cannot be corroborated with 
empirical information for the Colombian case, since the fiscal effort and current income as a 
percentage of transfers variables are not statistically significant.  The same thing occurs with 
the municipalities’ socio-economic conditions (NBI and GINI), which indicates that these 
factors do not directly influence either electoral behaviour or, more specifically, the effective 
number of parties for Colombia’s municipalities. 
 
Table 3: Explicative Model of the Effective Number of Parties 
 
Explicative Variables  Total Period (1988-2000) 
Constant 0.35162* 0.21810 
Political Variables 
Magnitude of the Electoral District (ME) 
0.05867*** 
0.01146 
Fiscal Effort Variables 
Tax income as a percentage of total income (FE) 
-0.22566 
0.32295 
Decentralisation Variables 
Participation in current national income as a percentage of the transfers (D) 
-0.09951 
0.17491 
Socio-economic Variables 
Unmet Basic Needs (UBN) Index 
-0.00149 
0.00209 
Violence and Armed Conflict Variables 
Military activity of the armed actors (FARC, ELN, EPL) (AGA) 
 
 
Homicide Rate (HR) 
 
-0.00576 
0.00998 
 
-0.00216*** 
0.00082 
Control Variables 
Effective Number of Parties, spatially lagged (SAV) 
 
Pacific Region 
 
Caribbean Region 
 
Eastern Region 
 
0.67227*** 
0.03712 
0.14745* 
0.08898 
-0.15846* 
0.09379 
0.32920** 
0.13597 
Methodology 
 
Number of Observations 
Number of Observations per group 
R^2 
Panel Data (Random effects) 
 
1427 
521 
 
0.2273 
 
The right column contains the value of the coefficient for each variable and indicates whether it is significant 
(*** the coefficient is significantly different from 0 to 99% reliability; ** the coefficient is significantly different 
from 0 to 95% reliability; * the coefficient is significantly different from 0 to 90% reliability; with no asterisks 
the coefficient is not significantly different from 0).  The value of each coefficient corresponds to the standard 
error.  
 
The formula for the effective number of estimated parties is given by: 
 
   ^  ^   ^  ^  ^ 
ENP i,t  = ß + ß ME + ß HR + ß SAV + E i,t i,t i,t 1 2 3 i,t 0 
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where 
ENP effective number of parties 
0b  represents the constant 
ME magnitude of the electoral district 
HR   Homicide rate 
SAV Spatial association variable 
i Municipality indicator 
t Time indicator 
 
According to Hug, party diversity, or the emergence of new political forces, is associated with 
the emergence of new issues in the political arena.  In this regard, it would be expected that 
the greater the inequality and percentage of the population with unmet basic needs (UBN), the 
greater the number of parties in posts of political representation defending the different 
interests of the more marginal social sectors.  Nonetheless, according to the statistical results 
presented here, it can be said that there is no relationship between party diversity and the 
levels of inequality and UBN, which could mean that the political issues associated with the 
rise of new parties has to do with types of demand other than socio-economic ones or with 
factors of a different nature, such as the type of leadership or the form of politicking.  
 
The statistical proof of the direct negative effects of violence on the number of parties in the 
period coincides with tendencies observed in previous analyses for the elections of mayors 
and Council members in previous years.  Marco Romero, for example, does a thorough 
analysis of the municipalities’ electoral guarantees, examining how they are being affected by 
the recomposition of the internal armed conflict and the new strategies of political control 
used by the armed groups outside the law. 51  
 
Currently, the pressure of the irregular armed groups is affecting political representation and 
the composition of the party system even more (i.e., it is endangering the very existence of 
certain parties) as well as the distribution of votes or posts among the different political 
forces.  Thus, for the 2003 elections, the Colombian Federation of Municipalities reported 22 
municipalities with single candidates, cases in which the armed groups forced candidates 
from parties opposed to their political project to withdraw under threat.  
 
Regarding the importance of the spatial factor, on the other hand, it is important to mention 
that the tendencies presented by given municipalities are affected by the electoral behaviour 
of nearby ones.  This spatial factor possibly indicates a relationship between the effective 
number of parties and cultural factors as well as aspects associated with the socio-political 
context of the area in question.  Party predominance, for example, has regional behaviour that 
can be explained by political traditions in the municipalities that influence the emergence of 
new parties.    
                                                 
51 Romero (2004).  This study gathers data from the Federación Nacional de Concejales, which reports 55 
Council members killed in the first 11 months of 2002 and 1,800 others displaced by violence as of that same 
date (81.5% of the 12,000 there are in the country).  In the case of mayors, the Federación Colombiana de 
Municipios reports the murder of 64 local rulers between 1998 and 2003.  By the latest elections for Council 
members and mayors, held in October 2003, this tendency not only remained but worsened: as of 7 October, 11 
mayoral candidates had been killed, over 160 candidates had withdrawn and 9 sitting mayors were killed during 
that year.  According to this same institution, between 80 and 100 mayors had gone into exile for reasons of 
personal security by August 2003.  
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In synthesis, it can be said that party diversity in Colombia’s political system, measured 
through the effective number of parties in collegial bodies (Municipal Councils), is associated 
with the normative electoral framework and population size, aspects favourable to the 
emergence of new parties without this implying their continuity in electoral races or 
permanence in posts of political representation. 
 
The levels of common violence are directly affecting the effective number of parties because 
there is a tendency to resolve social conflicts and differences through violence and this 
translates into intimidation against candidates or movements that oppose the political projects 
defended in this manner.  Irregular armed groups are using violence in contexts of internal 
armed conflict to guarantee political control of the entities of political representation, which 
often translates into the regulation of local political life via armed means, where opposition or 
the exercise of differences is increasingly difficult, which would explain a limited party 
system in these areas.  
 
The above demonstrates that local democracy is fragile in the framework of the current armed 
conflict.  There are threats to the requisites included in a minimalist definition of democracy: 
free and fair elections, free competition for popularly elected posts, the right to elect and be 
elected, all of them basic indicators of the index of electoral democracy drawn up by the 
UNDP for Latin America. 
 
Finally, spatial and regional factors directly affect the size of the party system insofar as 
political practices and traditions in Colombia seem to have similar parameters in nearby areas 
and are differentiated in each identified region.  This result is interesting because it allows for 
identifying the importance of cultural and historical factors in explaining Colombia’s electoral 
behaviour and specifically its party system.  
 
 
Electoral Participation 
In examining the proposed model for explaining electoral participation (Table 4), one 
observes that the most relevant variables overall are decentralisation, the UBN Index, the 
homicide rate and the guerrilla military actions.  
 
In the first place, the decentralisation variables (the municipalities’ tax income as a percentage 
of total income and their current income as a percentage of the transfers) are statistically 
significant.  The relationship between the fiscal effort and electoral participation is positive; 
that is, the greater the level the municipalities’ tax income relative to their total income, the 
greater the electoral participation.  This could be indicating high voter interest in influencing 
the destination of the resources obtained through taxes in municipalities where these taxes 
represent an important proportion of the municipal treasury, probably because the bulk of the 
voters in these cases are also the contributors and because the mayor and the Municipal 
Council have more manoeuvring room to decide the destiny of the resources when they come 
from the municipality itself.  This situation is different in cases where the majority of the 
municipality’s resources come from transfers, since they have a specific destination according 
to what is stipulated in Law 60 of 1993. 
 
The relationship between electoral participation and the percentage of current national income 
received by the municipality as a percentage of transfers is negative.  This could be 
understood by considering that the municipality’s dependence on the central level is greater 
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when the current national income received by the municipality represents a greater proportion 
of the transfers.  Consequently, there could be less room for manoeuvre regarding investments 
for the local governments, which could be a disincentive for voters.  
 
In the second place, with respect to socio-economic variables, the Gini index of private 
property concentration is not significant, contrary to the significance of the UBN index.  The 
relationship between this latter variable and electoral participation is positive, indicating that 
electoral participation is greater when a larger number of basic needs are unsatisfied, which 
could be explained by considering that election of the mayor becomes an opportunity to 
improve the municipality’s conditions or its citizens’ quality of life.  The theoretical 
postulates of decentralisation suggest that a closer relationship between governors and 
governed, or between electors and those elected, promotes more direct civic participation 
when there is a real possib ility of affecting decision-making concerning the constitution of the 
government and, via it, about local politics.  
 
On the other hand, this participation via the vote becomes an effective control mechanism by 
the electorate over the actions of the rulers.  The relationship between high UBN levels and 
high participation levels could be understood in this way, indicating an electoral discontent 
with previous administrations that were unable to modify living conditions in the locality. 
 
In the third place, the variables of common and armed violence included in the model were 
significant.  Both the armed actions of the guerrillas (FARC, ELN, EPL) and the homicide 
rate are negatively related to electoral participation.  In this regard, it is important to consider 
that the intervention of armed actors in electoral processes has been gaining strength as a 
political strategy, through either pressure on the population to vote for a specific candidate or 
the obstruction of participation. 52  
 
                                                 
52 Miguel García & Gary Hoskin, ‘Participación Política y Guerra en Colombia. Un Análisis de las Elecciones de 
2002’, in  Gary Hoskin, Rodolfo Masías and Miguel García (eds), Colombia 2002: Elecciones, Comportamiento 
Electoral y Democracia, Bogotá: Departamento de Ciencia Política, CESO, Fundación Konrad Adenauer, 
Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2003, pp. 223-262.  On this 
aspect, Hoskin and García argue that in the 2002 elections for the chamber of representatives, “to the action of 
illegal armed actors (guerrilla and paramilitary) against candidates and their campaign organisations, can be 
added the multiple intimidations of the citizenry. These actions took two forms: to force citizens to vote for a 
particular candidate, or simply to impede citizens from exercising their suffrage”. On the other hand, one of the 
results found in the study by these authors is that a relationship exists between the presence and actions of the 
armed actors and electoral participation levels (García & Hoskin, 2003, p.233).  
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Table 4: Explicative Model of Electoral Participation 
 
Explicative Variables  Total Period (1988-2000) 
Constant 0.70884*** 0.02627 
Fiscal Effort Variables 
Tax income as a percentage of total income (FE) 
 
0.08059*** 
0.02859 
Decentralisation Variables 
Participation in current national income as a percentage of the transfers (D) 
 
-0.04261*** 
0.01570 
Socio-economic Variables 
Gini of private property concentration 
 
Unmet Basic Needs (UBN) Index 
 
-0.01525 
0.03040 
0.00032** 
0.00018 
Violence and Armed Conflict Variables 
Activity of the armed actors (FARC, ELN, EPL)  (AGA) 
 
Homicide Rate (HR) 
 
 
-0.00339*** 
0.00051 
-0.00027*** 
0.00004 
Control Variables 
Population categorization 
 
-0.04518*** 
0.00347 
 
Pacific Region 
 
Caribbean Region 
 
Eastern Region 
0.01958* 
0.00916 
0.08466*** 
0.00960 
-0.04488*** 
0.01386 
Methodology 
 
Number of Observations 
Number of Observations per group 
R^2 
Panel Data  (Random effects) 
 
3011 
688 
 
0.3208 
 
The right column contains the value of the coefficient for each variable and indicates whether the coefficient is 
significant (*** the coefficient is significantly different from 0 to 99% reliability; ** the coefficient is 
significantly different from 0 to 95% reliability; * the coefficient is significantly different from 0 to 90% 
reliability; with no asterisks the coefficient is not significantly different from 0).  The value of each coefficient 
presented below corresponds to the standard error.  
 
The negative relationship between the participation level and violence, measured based on the 
activity of the armed actors, agrees with the results found by García and Hoskin, according to 
which a positive relationship exists between the guerrilla actions and the levels of electoral 
abstention. 53  In addition, these authors found that homicide violence also affects electoral 
participation.  On the latter, as Table 4 shows, a significant negative relationship is observed 
between the homicide rate and electoral participation.  
 
                                                 
53 García & Hoskin (2003). 
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According to the above, it could be said that the violence is affecting the democratic rules of 
the game, because it not only directly constrains voters, but also generates adverse conditions 
for the exercise of civil and political rights.  For example, characteristics of the intensification 
of the conflict and political polarization the county is going through, such as the singling out 
of certain organised sectors of civil society or residents of specific territories, blockades of the 
free circulation of individuals by all armed actors, threats and armed confrontation, among 
others. 
  
Finally the variables used as control, in other words population categorisation and being from 
a certain region (Pacific, Caribbean, Eastern and Andean), are also significant.  Regarding the 
population, it was found that municipalities belonging to categories with smaller populations 
present higher participation levels, while those belonging to categories with larger populations 
register lower levels. 
 
A possible hypothesis for this behaviour is that there is more direct contact between governors 
and governed in smaller municipalities, and that this generates greater incentives to 
participation and involvement in public affairs.  It could be suggested, however, that the 
smaller municipalities are where clientelist relations associated with traditional forms of 
politicking in Colombia are more deeply rooted, and that these are a motor force for greater 
participation.  
  
The formula of estimated electoral participation (EP) is given by: 
 
        
 
where 
0b  represents the constant 
FE is the variable representing the fiscal effort 
D   represents fiscal decentralisation, measured as a percentage of the current national 
income that the municipality receives over income from transfers 
UBN  unmet basic needs  
AGA  armed guerrilla activity  
HR       homicide rate 
i municipality indicator 
t time indicator 
 
In synthesis, the results of the explicative model for the level of electoral participation in the 
popular election of mayors shows that violence and the internal armed conflict are affecting 
the guarantees for the exercise of civil and political rights in the Colombian municipalities.  
Not only because the right to vote is being coerced by the armed actors but also because in 
many regions, above all the rural areas to which the guerrilla groups are retreating, this right 
is vetoed.  
 
On the other hand, the intensification of the armed conflict and the current security policies 
applied by the government at the national level are generating conditions adverse to the free 
exercise of civil and political rights.  The configuration of a humanitarian crisis with many 
dimensions makes the development of participatory processes in local settings more difficult.  
 
  ^   ^  ^  ^  ^  ^   ^
EP i,t  = ß + ß FE + ß D + ß UBN + ß AGA + ß HR + E i,t 3 i,t i,t 4 i,t 5 i,t 0 1 i,t 2 
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The importance of the UBN Index reveals the interest of sectors with difficulties accessing 
economic, social and cultural rights in influencing the political decisions that directly affect 
them.  It can be understood as a process of social control over the rulers’ actions in 
municipalities where the mayor has a broader margin for deciding the destination of 
resources, or where there is less dependence on transfers from the central level.  Fiscal 
decentralisation seems to have benefited electoral participation when it has permitted greater 
autonomy for local governments in drawing and distributing public resources.  
 
 
Conclusions  
This study attempts to show some of the tendencies of electoral behaviour with respect to 
decentralisation, violence and other socio-economic factors of the Colombian municipalities.  
In this regard, it was possible to contrast some theoretical postulates and findings of studies 
on decentralisation and electoral behaviour based on empirical information for the decade of 
the nineties.  
 
Specifically, the statistical analysis was aimed at explaining the political participation level 
and effective number of parties variables as the result of various different factors: indicators 
of decentralisation, of a socio-economic nature, of violence, and those related to electoral 
norms.  The study’s main thesis is that these electoral variables cannot be explained via 
decentralisation in Colombia, but that decentralisation has only a relative impact on the 
tendencies observed in the formal political system, together with other factors.  
 
At a descriptive level, the study showed that the highest levels of participation during the 
period were recorded in 1988, when the popular election of mayors was instituted, and they 
were never repeated despite the increase observed again in 2000.  The relative success of the 
1986 decentralising reforms in their first year of application is reflected primarily in the 
electoral participation levels, indicating the incorporation of a significant proportion of 
citizens into the formal mechanisms for electing a government, particularly at the beginning 
of the process.  Nonetheless, this tendency did not continue over time.  
 
On the other hand, a positive impact of the 1991 constitutional reforms are observed in the 
incorporation of different forces into the political system, as there is an increase in the 
effective number of parties as of 1992 that indicates the move from a bipartite system to one 
with more than 2 parties.  The access of different political forces to popularly elected posts 
(mayoral offices) is a constant pattern throughout the period and common to the majority of 
municipalities of major population size.  Nonetheless, it must be kept in mind that this could 
be accompanied by a growing de- institutionalisation of the party system in the past decade.  It 
is also necessary to note that, despite the changes observed over the decade, the national 
average of the effective number of parties for the period is approximately 2.5 parties, which 
indicates that the Colombian system continues approximating the bipartite scheme more than 
a multi-party one.  
 
At an explicative level, the results of the model for the effective number of parties show that 
the bulk of Colombia’s municipalities do not validate the hypothesis according to which fiscal 
decentralisation functions as an incentive for the creation of new political movements that 
would be competing for direct influence on the distribution of public resources (whether for 
personal benefit or for a specific social sector). 
 
 25
In contrast, factors associated with the characteristics of the electorate’s political culture, such 
as the regional context and geographical proximity to other municipalities with similar 
behaviour, show greater weight in explaining the number of parties.  Thus, the existence of a 
political culture in the rural areas and in determined regions may have a large influence on the 
size of the party system.  
 
On the other hand, the results showed that the levels of common violence directly influenced 
the effective number of parties.  The explicative weight of homicide rates on this variable 
seems to indicate that full conditions do not exist for the exercise of difference in violent 
settings and that this is being reflected in the political filed.  In the longer term, the relation 
between homicide rates and the effective number of parties shows a context that constitutes a 
threat for the exercise of civil and political rights related to the constitution of the government 
and becomes part of the basic dimensions of the democratic regime. 
 
With respect to electoral participation, the explicative model showed the negative and direct 
effects of violence and the armed internal conflict on the exercise of the right to vote.  This 
could mean that political control via armed means is consolidating through direct coercion of 
voters or is degenerating into contexts of confrontation between the different armed groups 
that impedes political participation within institutional channels.  In any event, the 
relationship between violence, conflict and electoral participation shows that the forms of 
political control via armed means are affecting democracy and local government. 
 
The above results pose challenges in interpreting the changes produced within the Colombian 
party system.  First, they reflect the importance of factors such as political culture or regional 
patterns that have not been explored with sufficient rigour.  Second, they make evident the 
difficulty that decentralising reforms face in violent contexts, where state control of the 
national territory is precarious, clientelist practices have mediated the relations between 
electors and elected, and irregular armed groups are co-opting the institutions via different 
regulatory mechanisms aimed at ensuring political control in the local sphere. 
 
On the other hand, the results regarding the analysis of electoral behaviour show that the 
meaning of the different indicators (electoral backing, level of electoral participation and 
effective number of parties) is complex because it becomes necessary to contextualise these 
results always in the light of qualitative case analyses. Combining qualitative techniques with 
quantitative ones could make a difference with a more complete interpretation of electoral 
behaviour. 
 
Finally, any discussion about the meanings of democracy in Colombia requires a more in-
depth analysis, beyond the need to promote an opening of the formal political system.  The 
data presented here are an approximation to these latter aspects, but it is necessary to examine 
others related to the weakness of the institutions in guaranteeing the exercise of citizenship in 
the social, civil and political spheres, above all in the rights referring to the constitution of the 
government.  The debate about the meaning of democracy in Colombia must suggest 
responses for dealing with the weaknesses of the local institutions, when they are permeated 
or obstructed by actions of the armed groups and by political actors who reproduce practices 
such as clientelism or patronage.  In this context, it is important to develop control 
mechanisms such as inspectorships or the accompaniment of electoral participation processes 
by international organisations.  
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